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THE RULE OF LENITY AND HYBRID STATUTES:
WEC C4ROLLVA ENERGY SOLUTIONS LLC V. MILLER

Stephen Wills Murphy*
Congress and state legislatures regularly create statutes with both civil and
criminal punishments for certain violations. The application of principles of
statutory interpretation to those "hybrid" statutes can lead to unintended results.
Under the rule of lenity, an ambiguity in a criminal statute is resolved in favor of
the defendant. thereby narrowing potential criminal liability and giving fair
warning to potential defendants. But the application of the rule of lenity to an
ambiguity in a hybrid statute is unclear; courts and commentators have recently
debated whether the rule of lenity should apply only to criminal applications of
hybrid statutes, to criminal and civil applications, or to neither. Although the
Supreme Court has suggested that the rule of lenity might appl categorically to
all applications of a hybrid statute, whether civil or criminal, one scholar has
noted that this use of the rule "creates the paradox that, although Congress would
probably imagine itself to be strengtheninga statute by adding criminal penalties
to it,

. .

. the addition of such penalties has the effect of weakening the statute,

because courts may then feel obliged to apply the rule of lenity ... in civil
cases."
Despite the concerns of courts and commentators, in WEC CarolinaEnergy
Solutions LLC v. Afiller 4 the Fourth Circuit held that the rule of lenity applies
categorically to both civil and criminal provisions in a hybrid statute. 5 The
court's conclusions, and the apparent ease with which it reached those
conclusions, implicates significant policy considerations for the interpretation of
future hybrid statutes.
The rule of lenity is a well-established interpretative principle that resolves
ambiguities in criminal statutes in favor of the defendant.6 That is, if a court
finds that an ambiguity in a penal statute persists after it has employed all other
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1. See Zachary Price, The Rule of Lenity as a Rule of Structure, 72 FORDHAM L. REv. 885,
885 (2004).
2.
See Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 12 n.8 (2004).
3.
Jonathan R. Siegel, The Polymorphic Principle and the Judicial Role in Statutory
Interpretation,84 TEX. L. REV. 339, 392 (2005).
4.
687 F.3d 199 (4th Cir. 2012).
5.
Id. at 204.
6.
See Price, supra note 1. at 886-89 (describing the classic rationales for applying the rule
of lenity in statutory construction).
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means of statutory interpretation, it must resolve the ambiguity in a way that
narrows or reduces the potential criminal liability., The rule of lenity only
applies to penal statutes, and it is grounded in principles of fair warning and
legislative supremacy that are unique to the criminal context.8
A problem arises, however, when the statutory ambiguity occurs in a statute
with both penal and civil provisions. The typical "hybrid" scheme is as follows:
Section One prohibits certain conduct; Section Two creates a private cause for
damages for such conduct; and Section Three makes a particular subclass of
conduct-such as a willful or knowing violation-a crime. 9 Such "hybrid"
statutes are commonplace; examples include the Sherman Act,10 the Racketeer
Influenced and Corru t Organizations Act, the Bankruptcy Code, and even
the Clean Water Act. These statutes are predominantly enforced through their
civil components.14 Other statutes, such as the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act
(CFAA), 15 which is the subject of Miller, is predominantly enforced through its
criminal provisions.
A question arises when the hybrid statute contains an ambiguity that can
apply to both the civil and the criminal provisions. This presents a persistent
problem that scholars have called "intractable"1 and "a difficult question" for
courts. 1s

Courts and commentators have disagreed about whether the rule of lenity
should categorically apply to both criminal and civil applications of the
ambiguity, should categorically apply to neither, should categorically apply to
one but not the other, or should apply based on a case-by-case analysis of the
contours of the statute.
Such a case-by-case determination would depend on
whether the statute is more "civil" or "criminal" in nature; for example, many
hybrid statutes include a criminal provision that appears to be an "afterthought"
to an otherwise straightforward statutory regime that provides for civil
penalties.20
In Miller, the Fourth Circuit confronted an ambiguity in a civil proceeding
under the CFAA. which has both civil and criminal provisions.21 The case arose

7.

See id. at 885.

8.

CALEB NELSON, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 108-12 (2011).

9.
Jonathan Marx, How; to Construe a HybridStatute, 93 VA. L. REv. 235, 235 (2007).
10. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2006).
11. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (2006).
12. See II U.S.C. §§ 101-1532 (2006).
13. See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2006).
14. See e.g., Marx, supra note 9. at 238. 281-82 & n1.138 (discussing the infrequent
application ofthe Bankruptcy Code provisions in a penal context).
15. 18 U.S.C § 1030 (2006).
16. WEC Carolina Energy Solutions LLC v. Miller. 687 F.3d 199, 201 (4th Cir. 2012).
17. Marx, supra note 9. at 235.
18. NELSON, supra note 8, at 136.
19. Id. at 136 37.
20. Id. at 137 (citing Marx, supra note 9, at 282).
21. 687 F.3d at 201.
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out of a dispute between industry competitors based in the same county in South
Carolina, in which one company accused a former employee of misappropriation
of confidential information.22 The principal defendant, Mike Miller, was a
Project Director for WEC Carolina Energy Solutions, Inc. (WEC), which
provided specialized welding services to the power industry.
Miller resigned
WEC later alleged that prior to resigning, Miller
on April 30, 2010.24
"downloaded a substantial number of [its] confidential documents" to his
personal computer and email address.
Less than a month later, Miller went to
work for WEC's competitor, Arc Energy Services, Inc. (Arc). 26 Miller soon
made a presentation to a potential client using WEC's proprietary information,
and he won the contract for Arc.
WEC was not shy about its response. It brought suit in federal court against
Miller, his assistant Emily Kelley, and Arc, with nine state law causes of action
and one claim under the federal CFAA. 8
Miller filed a motion to dismiss the count under the CFAA, alleging that
WEC had failed to state a claim.29 At stake was federal court jurisdiction over
the case-the alleged violation tinder the CFAA was the plaintiffs sole federal
claim, and it gave the federal court subject matter jurisdiction over the entire
matter. 30 Through the motion to dismiss, Miller sought to require Arc to bring
the action in state court.
The CFAA penalizes any individual who "accesse[s] a computer without
authorization or exceed[s] authorized access" and obtains protected
information.3 1 Although the Act criminalizes various forms of improper access
to electronic information, it seems focused on computer hackers; as the Fourth
Circuit summarized, the CFAA is "primarily a criminal statute designed to
combat hacking."32
Miller's motion to dismiss turned on whether WEC had sufficiently alleged
that Miller had violated the CFAA when he downloaded files from his work
computer to his personal computer.3 3 Under WEC policies, Miller was permitted
to work with certain files on his work computer, but he was prohibited from
downloading that information to a personal computer.34 Miller argued, however,

22.

Id at 201-02.

23.
24.

Id
Id. at 202.

25. Id.
26. Id
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id
30. See id.
31. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(1); see also id. § 1030(a)(2)(C), (a)(4). (a)(5)(B) (describing similar
conduct deemed culpable under the CFAA).
32. Miller, 687 F.3d at 201 (citing A.V ex rel. Vanderhye v. iParadigms, LLC, 562 F.3d 630,
645 (4th Cir. 2009)).
33.

See id. at 202-03.

34. Id. at 202.
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that WEC's policies were about "use" of information, whereas the CFAA
penalized only improper "access."3
The district court held that WEC had failed to state a claim inder the
CFAA.3 6 The court reasoned that under WEC policies, Miller was permitted to
have "access" to the files, and even though WEC alleged that he improperly
downloaded those files, such an action was only improper "use" of the files to
which he had rightful access.
The district court further found that even if his
"purpose in accessing the information was contrary to company policies
regulating use, it would not establish a violation of company policies relevant to
access and, consequently, would not support liability tinder the CFAA."
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit examined the key phrases-access "without
authorization" and "exceeds authorized access"-in the CFAA.3 In particular,
the Fourth Circuit set out to "examine whether these terms extend to violations
of policies regarding the use of a computer or information on a computer to
which a defendant otherwise has access."4a
There was a lack of case law on the issue, but the Fourth Circuit at least
noted that the Ninth Circuit, on a rehearing en banc, had recently interpreted
these phrases narrowly, in a way that favored the defendant and limited CFAA
liability only to situations in which an employee was prohibited from accessing
the files in the first instance.4 1 In that case, United States v. Nosal,42 the Ninth
Circuit reversed a panel's decision and held that the defendants did not violate
the CFAA when they accessed confidential information of their employer using
their own valid user accounts and then subsequently transferred that information
to a competitor.43
With this case law in mind, the Fourth Circuit in Miller focused its analysis
on the definitions of "access" and "authorization" to determine whether such
words should be limited to improper access in the first place, or whether they

35. Brief of Appellees at 12-19, WEC Carolina Energy Solutions LLC v. Miller, 687 F.3d
199 (2012) (No. 11-2101), 2011 WL 2619514 at *12 19.
36. See WEC Carolina Energy Solutions LLC v. Miller, No. 0:10-cy-2775-CMC, 2011 WL
379458, at *7 (D.S.C. Feb. 3, 2011).
37. Id. at *5.
38. Id.
39. Miller, 687 F.3d at 203 (referring to 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2)(C), (a)(4), (a)(5)(B),
(a)(5)(C) (2006)).
40. Id.
41. Id. The Fourth Circuit also discussed, and declined to follow, the reasoning of the
Seventh Circuit. which had held that a breach of the duty of loyalty destroys the agency relationship
that enables an employee to access confidential files; the Seventh Circuit thus held that an employee
violated the CFAA by erasing crucial data on his company laptop prior to turning it in at the end of
his employment. Id. at 203. (discussing and declining to follow Int'l Airport Ctrs., LLC v. Citrin,
440 F.3d 418 (7th Cir. 2006)). The Fourth Circuit concluded that the Seventh Circuit's holding
would have "far-reaching effects unintended by Congress," by subjecting to liability under the
CFAA any employee who breached a minor duty to his employer and then accessed files on the
computer network for any purpose. Id. at 206.
42. 676 F.3d 854 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc).
43. Id. at 856. 86344.
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could be construed to also include misuse of information that was properly
obtained.44
The court then fell back on the "ordinary, contemporary, common
meaning"45 of the term "authorization"-"that an employee is authorized to
access a computer when his employer approves or sanctions his admission to that
computer." 46 The court further reasoned that under the ordinary meaning, an
employee "exceeds authorization" when he has authorization to access the
computer but does not have authorization to access certain information on that
computer. 47 The court concluded that in sum, "[n]otably, neither of these
definitions extends to the improper use of information validly accessed."48
Nevertheless, the court found some potential ambiguity in the statutory
terms-particularly in one potential reading endorsed by the Ninth Circuit panel
in Aosal. 49 In its opinion, the panel noted that in the definitions section, the
CFAA defined "exceeds authorized access" to mean "to access a computer with
authorization and to use such access to obtain or alter information in the
computer that the accesser is not entitled so to obtain or alter."50 In an
interesting read of the statute. the Ninth Circuit reasoned that in the phrase "not
entitled so to obtain or alter," the "so" should be read as "in that manner," thus
penalizing access to infornation that the employee "is not entitled [in that
manner] to obtain or alter."51 The Ninth Circuit panel thus concluded that the
CFAA's reference to an employee who "exceeds authorized access" introduced
the idea of use and authorized use. and was not simply referring to authorized
access. 52
The Fourth Circuit did not find this reading of "so" to be compelling; even
granting that "so" could mean "in that manner," the Fourth Circuit concluded
that the statute referred only to unauthorized access, not unauthorized use.
But perhaps to remove any doubt, or to remove the necessity of reaching a
final and binding decision on that issue, the Fourth Circuit applied the rule of

44. Miller. 687 F.3d at 204.
45. Id. (quoting Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979)).
46. Id. The Court also briefly noted the definitions from the Oxford English Dictionary,
vhich defined "access" as '"[t]o obtain, acquire,' or [t]o gain admission to,"' id. (quoting OXFORD
ENGLISH DICTIONARY (3d ed. 2011) (alteration in original)), and defines "authorization" as "formal
warrant, or sanction," id. (quoting OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989)) (internal
quotation marks omitted). The Fourth Circuit quickly discussed the "ordinary" meaning of the
phrase, and the place of the Oxford English Dictionary in its reasoning is not clear. See id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. See id. at 205.
50. United States v. Nosal, 642 F.3d 781, 785 (9th Cir. 2011), rev'd en banc. 676 F.3d 854
(9th Cir. 2012) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(6)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
51. Id. at 785-86 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(6)).
52. See id.
53. Miller. 687 F.3d at 205.
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lenity to conclude that any ambiguity, such as it was, must be resolved to render
the statute narrower in application.
The court's reasoning consisted of two parts. First, the court found that the
principle of consistency required application of the rule of lenity to the civil and
criminal application of the statute . The court reasoned, "Where, as here, our
analysis involves a statute whose provisions have both civil and criminal
application, our task merits special attention because our interpretation applies
uniformly in both contexts. 6
Second, the Fourth Circuit noted that the criminal provision must be read
narrowly, inder the rule of lenity. The court reasoned, "[1]n the interest of
providing fair warning 'of what the law intends to do if a certain line is
passed,' . . . we

will

construe

this

criminal

statute

strictly

and

avoid

interpretations not 'clearly warranted by the text.'" 5 7
The Fourth Circuit concluded that, even granting the Ninth Circuit panel's
potential reading of the statute, "[F]aced with the option of tw7o interpretations,
we yield to the rule of lenity and choose the more obliging route."58
In addressing the motion to dismiss, the Fourth Circuit noted that the
complaint itself alleged that WEC gave Miller access to the confidential
information. 59 The complaint did allege wrongdoing on the part of Miller, but
only improper use of that information-not improper access in the first
instance.60 Because improper use falls outside of the scope of the CFAA as
interpreted by the Fourth Circuit, the court upheld the dismissal of the civil
claims under the CFAA. 61
Commentators had expressed concern that the application of the rule of
lenity to hybrid statutes "presents courts with a difficult question."6 Especially
in light of such concerns, the simplicity with which the Fourth Circuit
approached the case is refreshing. Nevertheless, the Fourth Circuit's reasoning
requires certain implicit assumptions about the operation of the rule of lenity and
other interpretive principles, which are worthy of further analysis.

54. See id. at 205-06.
55. Id at 204.
56. Id
57. Id. (quoting Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Crmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 704
n.18 (1995); Crandon v. United States, 494 U.S. 152, 160 (1990)).
58. Id at 205-06. The Fourth Circuit also noted that the Ninth Circuit panel's opinion, like
the Seventh Circuit's reading, discussed supra note 41, would radically expand the reach of the
statute. Id. at 206. The court noted that the Ninth Circuit panel's reading would criminalize an
employee violating the company's downloading policy to download to a personal computer so he
can work after hours and added, "we are unwilling to contravene Congress's intent by transforming
a statute meant to target hackers into a vehicle for imputing liability to workers wlio access
computers or information in bad faith, or who disregard a use policy." Id. at 206-07.
59. Id at 207.
60. Id
61. See id.
62. NELSON, supra note 8. at 136.
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The Fourth Circuit suggested that its outcome was required by the doctrines
of consistency.6 TheV were following a footnote in a prior Supreme Court
64
opinion, Leocal v. Ashcroft,6 in which the Court noted, "Because we must
interpret the statute consistently, whether we encounter its application in a
criminal or noncriminal context, the rule of lenity applies."6 5
But an emphasis on consistency, either within a given hybrid statute or
across all hybrid statutes, does not dictate the result reached by the Fourth
Circuit in Miller. This consistency only requires that a given principle be
applied uniformly; it does not provide any requirement for what that substantive
principle would be. In fact, consistency could also be attained through a
categorical refusal to apply the rule of lenity in any hybrid statute.
Moreover, the goal of consistency can still be met if the provisions are
interpreted on a case-by-case basis, as commentator Jonathan Marx would
advocate.66 So long as the civil and criminal applications of a given statute are
interpreted under the same principles, it does not affect intrastatutory consistency
to have one predominantly criminal statute, such as the CFAA, apply the rule of
lenity, while a predominantly civil statute, such as the Bankruptcy Code, does
not.
In fact, consistency is a goal that is separate and distinct from the rule of
lenity. The rule of lenity has a number of justifications, including fair warning to
potential criminal defendants, and a value judgment that the legislature, not
courts, should define the bounds of criminal infractions.6 7 None of its various
justifications, however, are grounded in consistency of application.6 8 To the
contrary, doctrines grounded in consistency, such as the presumption of
consistent usage, are predominantly descriptive in nature, in that they are
justified in large part because they accurately reflect default rules about what a
legislature would intend.69 Meanwhile, the rule of lenity is principally a
normative canon in that it reflects a judicial judgment of how a statute should be
read and is not justified based on any claim that legislatures endorse it. 0
Of course, although the goal of consistency and the rule of lenity do not
necessarily follow one another, a coordination of such doctrines is not laudable.
There is some merit to having a rule of how to read these provisions together
before reading either. In particular, if a statute's civil and criminal provisions are
interpreted without regard to one another, the statute's meaning might fall into
"path dependence."7 1 That is, if a court interprets the ambiguity in a criminal

63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

See Miller. 687 F.3d at 204.
543 U.S. I (2004).
Id at 12 n8.
See Marx, supra note 9. at 286.
See NELSON, supra note 8, at 108-12.
See id
See id at 113.
See id. at 108-12.
Marx, supra note 9. at 236-38.
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context first, as a matter of first impression, the court would be likely to apply
the rule of lenity-thus developing precedent that is more lenient in later civil
applications.72 Meanwhile, if a court interprets the ambiguity tinder a civil
application of the statute, it would develop precedent that does not reflect such
leniency, but rules of stare decisis would lead a court to adopt that reading in
criminal cases.7
But again, this aversion to the accidental outcomes of path dependence
would encourage a court to adopt some consistent, unitary interpretation of both
the civil and criminal applications of the statute, but it would not require the
court to apply the rule of lenity.
Thus, despite the ease with which the Fourth Circuit in Miller moved from
the goal of consistency to the rule of lenity, these two principles are actually
separate and distinct. Instead, the Fourth Circuit's conclusion involves two
parallel, discrete steps.
First, the Fourth Circuit concluded that the rule of lenity is a sufficiently
strong doctrine such that it should be applied to any criminal statute, no matter
how minor; indeed, the Fourth Circuit noted that the CFAA is "primarily a
criminal statute,"_ but nothing in its reasoning would limit the application of the
rule of lenity to hybrid statutes that are predominantly criminal.
Second, and independent of this endorsement of the rule of lenity, the Fourth
Circuit concluded that consistency is key to the interpretation of hybrid
statutes. 75 That is, both the civil and criminal applications of a statute must be
interpreted in the same light. 76 And because, under the Fourth Circuit's
reasoning, the criminal application of the statute is necessarily pinned to the rule
of lenity, the civil application must be interpreted in light of that criminal
application.
In conclusion, while it may be, as Jonathan Marx has it, that hybrid statutes
continue to offer "intractable" problems for courts and commentators, the
Fourth Circuit has cut through the tangle of policy concerns and held that the
rule of lenity is categorically applicable to both the civil and criminal aspects of
a hybrid statute.
But the ease with which the Fourth Circuit reached that
holding is misleading. In making a simple and elegant decision to apply the rule
of lenity categorically, the Fourth Circuit endorsed both the independent merits
of the rule of lenity and the need for consistency, even to the extent that the need
for consistency would require the rule of lenity to be applied in a civil context.
78

72. See id.
73. See, e.g., United States v. Plaza Health Labs., 3 F.3d 643, 648-49 (2d Cir. 1993)
(rejecting, in dicta, reasoning from prior civil suits under the Clean Water Act which would have
suggested a broader reading).
74. WEC Carolina Energy Solutions LLC v. Miller. 687 F.3d 199, 201 (4th Cir. 2012).
75. See id. at 204.

76. Id.
77.
78.

Marx, supra note 9. at 235.
See Miller. 687 F.3d at 204.
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This reasoning by the Fourth Circuit may help future courts navigate the
concerns of hybrid statutes, the rule of lenity, and other principles of statutory

interpretation.
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